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NO SMALL TRIUMPH: THE OUTLOOK FOR ARGENTINA’S
RENEWABLE ENERGY PROGRAMS
Nicolas R. Oliver | International Immersion Program – Argentina

I.

INTRODUCTION

Argentina is not a leading voice in the global conversation on climate change, but it
is a significant one. Geographically, Argentina has tremendous renewable energy potential,
primarily in the areas of wind, hydroelectric, and biomass generation. 1 And despite its
developing country status, Argentina has passed ambitious laws to incentivize renewable
energy utilization in the electricity and transportations sectors. 2 Public concern over
anthropogenic climate change in Argentina is also higher than in most other countries, 3
likely due to the intense desertification, water scarcity, and glacial melt effects that 3.5–4ºC
of warming would wreak on parts the country. 4 Argentina should be a paradigmatic
example of the type of country that the success of the Paris Climate Agreement depends
upon—but so far, it isn’t.

Martin Lythgoe, Renewable Generation in Argentina: Past Failures and A Plan for Future Success, 39
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 263, 323 (2009).

1

See generally The Global Climate Legislation Database, THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/legislation/the-global-climatelegislationdatabase/?region=all&country=Argentina&fromyear=all&toyear=all&emitter=all&income=all&fra
mework=all&execleg=all&category=all (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
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Nicholas St. Fleur, Where in the World Is Climate Change Denial Most Prevalent?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climatetalks/where-in-the-world-is-climate-denial-most-prevalent.
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Barros et al., Climate change in Argentina: trends, projections, impacts and adaptation, in WIRES
CLIMATE CHANGE (2009).
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Older international climate regimes like the Kyoto Protocol mistakenly held the
default view that developed, not developing, countries should lead in reducing greenhouse
gas emissions, and some ethicists and state leaders still ascribe to this point of view. 5 But
this view shifted with the adoption of the Durban Platform in 2011, which proposed that all
signatories to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopt
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). 6 INDCs are domestically proffered
voluntary climate mitigation and adaptation measures, which were released in the months
leading up to the UNFCCC’s Conference of Parties 21 in Paris and form the substance of
the greenhouse gas reductions agreed to in the Paris Agreement. 7 INDCs represent the nowwidespread view that climate change mitigation requires global participation. Implicitly, the
Durban Platform and Paris Agreement recognize that developing countries will at times be
best positioned to reduce emissions; in such scenarios, efficiency favors realizing least-cost
investments in emissions reductions first, regardless of whether they occur in developed or
developing countries. 8 The Paris Agreement’s inclusion of a finance mechanism for

5

See, e.g., Stephen M. Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 ETHICS 555, 579 (2004).

See Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6645.php (last
visited Apr. 18, 2016).
6

Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php (last visited Apr. 18,
2016).
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See generally David Weisbach and Stephen M. Gardner, DEBATING CLIMATE ETHICS (forthcoming
June 2016) (comparing efficiency-based approaches to curbing emissions with distributive justicebased approaches).
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renewable energy projects in developing countries, 9 and the Agreement’s approval of
“internationally transferred mitigation outcomes,” 10 reflect this fact.
In a Paris Agreement-governed world, Argentina exemplifies the type of high
renewable energy potential country that the Agreement’s success depends upon. Yet despite
its endowment with tremendous renewable resource potential, years of poor energy sector
management, economic isolationism, and under-enforcement of existing laws have halted
Argentina’s hopes of decoupling economic growth from emissions intensity. This essay
highlights how Argentina’s failure to implement emissions-reducing policies is a political
choice, not an economic inevitability or problem of legal design. I give specific attention to
the mistakes Argentina has made in enforcing its renewable energy laws and regulations and
drafting its INDC. Argentina is a reminder of the extraordinarily high barriers that political
parties can erect when anticompetitive behavior and hostility towards foreign markets
outweigh recognition of a global commons problem requiring a cooperative solution. This
essay concludes by considering the potential for change under President Mauricio Macri’s
administration and recommending policies that Macri’s administration adopt to support
renewable energy development and repair Argentina’s poor reputation on the international
climate stage.
II.

LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY PROGRAMS

A. Argentina’s Greenhouse Gas and Climate Profile

See Paris Agreement art. 9, opened for signature Apr. 22, 2016, available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/cop_auv_template_4b_new__1.p
df (advance unedited version).

9
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Id. at art. 6.
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Argentina produces .88% of global carbon dioxide emissions, on par with European
countries like Italy. 11 Argentina’s energy sector, including transportation and electricity,
accounts for 42.7% of the country’s annual greenhouse gas emissions. 12 Livestock (27.8%)
and land use change and forestry (21.1%) are the two other major emissions sources. 13
Within the electricity sector, Argentina relies heavily on generation from hydrocarbons
(54% natural gas, 6% diesel), large-scale hydroelectric (36%), and Nuclear (3%). 14
Renewable energy generation, primarily from 187 MW of installed wind turbines, only
accounts for 1% of Argentina’s electricity generation. 15
Argentina is quite vulnerable to climate change. Scientists expect that a 2–2.5ºC
average temperature increase would entail a localized 3.5–4ºC increase in the northern
regions of Argentina. 16 Warming on this scale would trigger desertification in parts of
Northern Argentina, necessitating a shift in agricultural production to western and southern
regions that may actually become more arable with the warming. 17 Argentina has already
seen significant glacier loss attributed to global warming, and experts project that some

María S. Alinao & Sebastián Galbusera, Presentacion De Resultadoscomponente 1: Aprovechamiento Del
Potencial Nacional Para La Mitigación Del Cambio Climático, CITY OF BUENOS AIRES (June 30, 2015),
http://www.ambiente.gov.ar/archivos/web/ProyTerceraCNCC/file/Presentacion%20Component
e%201.pdf.
11

12

Id.

13

Id.

Sumario: Características del Mercado durante el Año 2014, Compañía Administradora Del
Mercadomayorista Eléctrico Sociedad Anónima (CAMMESA), REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA,
http://portalweb.cammesa.com/Documentos%20compartidos/Informes/Informe%20Anual%2020
14v4.pdf.
14
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Id. All references in megawatts refer to annual nameplate capacity unless otherwise specified.
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Barros et al., supra note 4.

2da Comunicación Nacionalde la República Argentinaa la Convención delas Naciones Unidassobre Cambio
Climático, REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA (March 6, 2006),
http://www.ambiente.gov.ar/archivos/web/File/home_documentos/Informe_Final_2CN.pdf.
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glacial basins may disappear completely. 18 Decreased precipitation and recessed glaciers are
expected to impact water availability and salinity levels, which jeopardizes agricultural
productivity. 19 Argentina’s government has considered climate adaptation, emphasizing the
need for both infrastructure and emergency planning investments to protect against and
foresee extreme heat waves, precipitation events, and destructive floods and winds. 20
B. Laws, Regulations, and Legal Instruments
In 2006, Argentina adopted a renewable portfolio standard to regulate emissions
from the electricity sector. Laws 26,190 21 and 27,191 22 combine to set the following targets
for energy generation from renewable sources (defined to exclude large-scale hydropower):
Date

Minimum percentage of total electricity
consumed from renewable sources
8%
12%
16%
18%
20%

31 December 2017
31 December 2019
31 December 2021
31 December 2023
31 December 2025

Law 26,190, enacted in 2006, set an initial 10-year goal of supplying 8% of the
country’s electric generation from renewable energy. 23 The law defines renewable energy
broadly to include wind power, solar energy, geothermal energy, small-scale hydropower
(less than 50 MW capacity), sea power, biomass, landfill gases, biogas and purification plant

18

Barros et al., supra note 4.

19

Id.

Argentine Republic Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, submitted Oct. 1, 2015,
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Argentina/1/Argentina%2
0INDC%20Non-Official%20Translation.pdf.
20

21

Law No. 26,190, Dec. 27, 2006, [31064] B.O. 1 (Arg.).

22

Law No. 27,191, Oct. 21, 2015, [__] B.O. __ (Arg.).

Law No. 26,190. Initially, Argentina’s goal was for 8% renewable generation by the end 2016.
That has since been amended to December 2017.
23
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gases. 24 In order to incentivize the construction of new generation units, Law 26,190 gives
investors tax incentives, including a choice between “an accelerated compensation and
amortization of investments in capital goods or [ ] an advanced reimbursement or
compensation of the [value-added tax] payments made in connection with the import,
purchase or investment in such capital goods.” 25 The law also includes price incentives in
the form of a 15-year feed-in tariff tailored to the proposed source of generation; for
example, federally registered wind energy projects receive an added subsidy of ARS
$0.015/kWh above the spot price for solar energy and solar energy products receive an
additional ARS $0.9/kWh. 26
At some point between 2006 and 2009, it became clear that the feed-in tariff and tax
incentives were not enough to draw the development of new renewable projects. Anxious to
draw renewable energy investment, the Argentine executive branch announced the
GENREN program in 2009. 27 Under GENREN, Argentina directed its state-owned energy
company, ENARSA, to solicit bids for a range of renewable electricity projects totaling
1000 MW of generation capacity. 28 Among these, ENARSA sought “500 MW of wind
energy; 150 MW of liquid biofuel-fired power generation; 120 MW of solid urban waste;

Id. See also Francisco A. Macias & Gonzalo Santamaria, New Renewable Energy Promotion Law,
MARVAL O’FARRELL MAIRAL (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://marval.com.ar/publicacion/?id=12687&lang=en#_ednref2.
24

Pablo E. Arrascaeta, Is Argentina ready to promote renewable energies?, 3 THE J. OF WORLD ENERGY
L. & BUS. No. 1, 3 (2010).
25

26

Lythgoe, supra note 1, at 307.

Renewable Policy Energy Brief: Argentina, INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY (June
2015),
http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_RE_Latin_America_Policies_
2015_Country_Argentina.pdf.
27

28

Id.
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100 MW of biomass; 60 MW of small hydro; 30 MW of geothermal; 20 MW of solar; and
20 MW of biogas.” 29 GENREN’s primary benefit to renewable developers was a 15-year
power purchase agreement (PPA) with ENARSA, denominated in USD, a more stable
currency than the Argentine peso. 30
In late-October 2015, with national renewable energy capacity still hovering around
1%, 31 Argentina passed Law 27,191, which amended Law 26,190 to address some of its
deficiencies. The highlight of Law 27,191 is the lofty renewable portfolio standard it sets—
incremental annual increases to 20% renewable generation by 2025. 32 But as Law 26,190
showed, state actors have hardly treated renewables targets as binding in the past, so the key
to evaluating Law 27,191 is to determine whether the scheme it sets to promote investment
in renewables is strong enough to do so. To this effect, Law 27,191 replaces the unsuccessful
feed-in tariff program with a consumer-side mandate: all large consumers of energy with
demand over 300 kW must source their electricity in accordance with the schedule listed
above (8% renewables by December 31, 2017 and so on sequentially). 33 Failure to do so will
result in significant fines, and large consumers may choose to comply through selfgeneration, purchasing directly from generators or distributors, or purchasing through the
wholesale electricity market administrator, CAMMESA. 34 In order to reduce the impact on
large consumers, the law also caps the price that power generators can charge to large

29

Id.

30

Id.

Francisco A. Macias & Gonzalo Santamaria, New Renewable Energy Promotion Law, MARVAL
O’FARRELL MAIRAL (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://marval.com.ar/publicacion/?id=12687&lang=en#_ednref2.
31

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.
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consumers in new renewable energy PPAs at USD $113 per MW/h, a rate still significantly
higher than wind deals in neighboring Chile and Peru. 35 President Mauricio Macri is
currently developing an implementing regulation for Law 27,191, after which Argentina will
begin to accept tenders for new renewable energy projects. 36 Among the other features of
Law 27,191 are an expansion of the tax incentives for renewable generators contained in
Law 26,190 and a directive that CAMMESA diversify its residential energy mix in order to
meet the targets. 37 The cost cap does not restrain CAMMESA’s purchasing power, and if
directed by enforcement authorities, the market administrator can pass through renewable
generation prices to consumers. 38
As a final note, Argentina’s INDC under the Paris Agreement and bilateral energy
agreements between Argentina and the United States and China are also relevant quasi-legal
commitments Argentina has made with regard to development of renewable and low-carbon
energy. Argentina’s INDC, which was issued prior to the passage of Law 27,191, calls for a
unconditional 15% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 compared to business as
usual emissions projections for that year. 39 A 30% reduction is possible, Argentina claims,
with additional international financing, technology transfer, and capacity-building support
under the Paris Agreement. 40 President Mauricio Macri, who took office during the COP 21

Carlos St. James, How Argentina is transforming into a viable energy market, LATIN AM. ENERGY REV.
(Feb. 29, 2016), http://carlosstjames.com/renewable-energy/how-argentina-is-transforming-into-aviable-renewable-energy-market-2/.
35

36

Id.

37

Macias & Santamaria, supra note 31.

38

Id.

Argentine Republic Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, submitted Oct. 1, 2015,
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Argentina/1/Argentina%2
0INDC%20Non-Official%20Translation.pdf.
39

40

Id.
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in Paris, was not involved in the development of Argentina’s INDC. He has said recently
that he would revise and strengthen Argentina’s commitments under the Paris Agreement, 41
but it is still unclear whether the revised INDC would simply account for the expected
impacts of Law 27,191 or impose additional substantive obligations. This ongoing
uncertainty about Argentina’s commitments under its INDC muddles the immediate
impacts that its contents and the Paris Agreement generally may have on Argentina’s energy
sector.
Bilateral partnerships with China and the United States also may impact the future of
the country of Argentina’s energy sector, although potentially less so as Argentina reenters
capital markets and opens up to private foreign direct investment in the energy sector. 42 In
November 2015, Argentina and China agreed to a $15 billion deal for the construction of
two new nuclear power plants. 43 However, this deal appears to be on hold, as President
Macri “promised to review” all bilateral agreements reached by his predecessor, President
Cristina Kirchner. 44 And in March 2016, President Obama and President Macri agreed to
cooperate in the development of Argentina’s renewables sector, “including through U.S.

FACT SHEET: United States – Argentina Relationship, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 23, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/23/fact-sheet-united-states-%E2%80%93argentina-relationship-0.
41

Elaine Moore, Argentina nears $15bn bond issue in return to capital markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar.
2, 2016), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2869acbe-dfbe-11e5-b67fa61732c1d025.html#axzz46i8JJpLt.
42

Jamil Anderlini & John-Paul Rathbone, China to build two nuclear plants in Argentina in $15bn deal,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2d264e78-8cf9-11e5-a549b89a1dfede9b.html#axzz46i8JJpLt.

43

44

Id.
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assistance on market reform, system optimization, and integrating renewable energy in the
power grid.” 45
III.

DISCUSSION

The need for new energy generation in Argentina is at its highest. Argentina’s grid
currently operates at near capacity. 46 Without reserve electricity, Buenos Aires is vulnerable
to blackouts, which have occurred with frequency in recent years. 47 Yet Argentina’s 10-year
plan to integrate renewables to its grid, as drawn up in Law 26,190, has had negligible
impacts. 48 And at the risk of editorializing, it would take a miracle for the country attract the
3000 MW 49 of renewables needed within the next year and a half and reach 8% generation
by 2017 (for reference, current wind generation has stagnated at 187 MW 50). But as
suggested earlier,“[t]his is a failure not of the law itself but of executive branch policies over
the past decade which kept investors and lenders at bay.” 51 The status quo in Argentina has
been to under-enforce laws and ignore lessons from failed renewable energy legal regimes.
Change in the political trade winds is a necessary first step to resolving past renewable
energy development shortcomings. Once that takes place, small revisions to Argentina’s
renewable energy laws and regulations will bolster the program’s likelihood of success.

45

FACT SHEET: United States – Argentina Relationship, supra note 41.

46

Lythgoe, supra note 1, at 265.

Karina Martinez-Carter, Why Argentina can’t keep the lights on in Buenos Aires, QUARTZ (Jan. 14,
2014), http://qz.com/166452/why-argentina-cant-keep-the-lights-on-in-buenos-aires/.
47

48

See Sumario: Características del Mercado durante el Año 2014, supra note 14, at 30.

49

See St. James, supra note 35.

50

Sumario: Características del Mercado durante el Año 2014, supra note 14, at 30.

Carlos St. James, Five things Argentina can do to boost renewables, LATIN AM. ENERGY REV. (Jan. 9,
2016), http://carlosstjames.com/renewable-energy/five-things-argentina-can-do-to-boostrenewables/.

51
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A. Failed Laws and Responsible Parties
To this point, Argentina’s renewable energy laws and regulations have been abject
failures. From the beginning, Law 26,190 “was insufficient to allow the development of
renewable energy projects.” 52 This was due in part to the design of the feed-in tariff: because
the initial subsidy for renewable projects was tied to the spot price of electricity, rather than
actual project costs, the subsidies were too weak to outweigh significant uncertainties like
risks of breach, nonpayment by the Argentine government, or drops in the cost of oil and
gas. 53 Law 26,190’s failure was hardly a surprise—energy experts saw its incentive
deficiencies at least as early as 2009. 54
When President Cristina Kirchner’s administration issued Decree 562/2009,
enforcing Law 26,190 by creating GENREN program, the law’s main flaws and barriers
were not adequately addressed. GENREN sought and received tenders for 895 MW of
renewable projects, with the state-run energy company, ENARSA, acting as off-taker and
private developers acting as energy suppliers. 55 On paper, GENREN enabled the Argentine
government to claim it offered investors highly attractive, low-risk 15-year PPAs with a
staggering average price of $127/MWh for wind and $572/MWh for solar projects. 56 But
the government required that the PPA contracts between ENARSA and generators include
a clause permitting Argentina to unilaterally amend the details, including pricing. 57 As a

52

Macias & Santamaria, supra note 31.

See Lythgoe, supra note 1, at 332 –33 (“Consequently, renewable generators are not paid according
to their own costs but rather according to the costs of other generators, which is beneficial today
with oil prices over US$100 per barrel, but which would not be with cheap fuels.”).

53

54

See id.

55

See St. James, How Argentina is transforming into a viable energy market, supra note 35.

56

Id.

57

St. James, Five things Argentina can do to boost renewables, supra note 51.

11

result, nearly none of the developers that received tenders could raise equity and financing
for their projects. 58 Ultimately, the GENREN project produced only 77 MW of new wind
generation and 8 MW of solar generation, far less than the 1000 MW of renewable
generation it sought initially. 59 Because of its deceitful nature, one energy expert called
GENREN and its progeny “[a]n embarrassing state of affairs.” 60

B. Recent Changes in Laws and Behavior to Boost Renewables
With President Macri at Argentina’s helm, most signs suggest progress toward a
friendlier economic climate for investments in renewable energy. The dialogue surrounding
Law 27,191 is optimistic, 61 although it was passed and signed into law by the prior
administration and many details of the law’s implementation must still be worked out in a
regulation that Macri is expected to issue very soon. 62 It will not be completely clear until
after the regulation is released whether price barriers to private investment have been
resolved, and whether lenders and investors see renewable projects as attractive under the
new law. However, Macri has already announced an ambitious state-financed solar project,
comprising 700 MW and up to 3 GW of new generation, in the northern Jujuy region. 63

58

See St. James, How Argentina is transforming into a viable energy market, supra note 35.

59

Id.

60

Id.

See, e.g., St. James, supra note 35. But see Kevin LaMarca, Renewable Energy Initiatives: A Look at
Argentina and Law 26,190, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 583, 590 (2011) (quoting Carlos St. James
characterizing Law 26,190 and GENREN as “leav[ing] no doubt that Argentina is on its way to
developing a full-fledged renewable energies industry”).
61

62

St. James, supra note 35.

See Henry Lindon, 3,000 MW of New Solar Projects Planned In Argentina’s Jujuy Region, CLEAN
TECHNICA (Feb. 13, 2016), http://cleantechnica.com/2016/02/13/3000-mw-of-new-solar-projectsplanned-in-argentinas-jujuy-region/; Henry Lindon, Germany Company Plans 700 MW Of Solar For
Argentina Region (Jujuy), CLEAN TECHNICA (Mar. 20, 2016),
63
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Argentina’s path to 20% renewables by 2025 and a greater-than 30% GHG emissions
reduction by 2030 cannot be met exclusively with state-funded projects. Subsidies, tax
incentives to attract private investors, and procurement mandates for large commercial
consumers all raise the attractiveness of foreign investment in Argentine renewable projects,
but there are much larger economy-wide credit risk factors also relevant to the failure of past
renewable programs and the viability of future programs. Argentina famously defaulted on
almost USD $100 billion in sovereign debt obligations during the country’s 2001/2002
economic crisis. 64 The country’s long-fought legal battle with speculative “holdout”
bondholders under President Cristina Kirchner’s administration has been covered
extensively elsewhere, 65 but most recently, President Macri agreed to settle with the
remaining holdout debt-holders for USD $9.3 billion. 66 Thus, on Friday, April 22, 2016,
Argentina exited from default. 67
The resolution of Argentina’s sovereign debt default is a significant milestone for
renewable energy development for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, the resolution
means that, for the first time in 14 years, the country will once again have access to
international capital and credit markets. 68 The deal with holdouts is expected to bring in a

http://cleantechnica.com/2016/03/20/germany-company-plans-700-mw-of-solar-for-argentinaregion-jujuy/.
Argentina repays holdouts, says ciao to default, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016),
http://www.ft.com/fastft/2016/04/22/argentina-repays-holdouts-says-ciao-to-default/.

64

See, e.g., Carolyn Thomas & Nicolás Cachanosky, Argentina’s post-2001 economy and the 2014 default,
60 THE Q. REV. OF ECON. AND FIN. 70 (2016).
65

66

Argentina repays holdouts, says ciao to default, supra note 64.

67

Id.

Id. See also Jef Feeley & Bob Van Voris, Argentina Bans on Bond Payments Dropped by U.S. Judge,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-22/argentinabans-on-bond-payments-dropped-by-u-s-judge.
68
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wave of new foreign investment in infrastructure and energy-generation projects to grow the
economy and address Argentina’s energy shortages. 69 The same or similar renewable energy
projects tendered under GENREN, which failed due to financiers’ reluctance to support
Argentine projects, will likely get second looks with lending conditions quickly improving. 70
The second reason for optimism about renewables in a post-default Argentine economy is
the fact that Macri’s economic policies, across the board, are aimed at overturning the
economically isolationist and populist policies of the Kirchner era. For example, Macri has
lifted capital restrictions and export tariffs, 71 while gradually raising the subsidized domestic
electricity rates that were a big contributor to the deficit on which Argentina defaulted. 72
These inroads in just four months in office have set the stage for improvement in
Argentina’s credit ratings and poor global reputation as a destination for capital
investments. 73
C. Additional Recommendations to Bolster Renewable Energy Policy
Implementing sensible economic policies at the executive level is a crucial first step,
but plenty of uncertainty still exists about whether Macri will be able to overcome past
failures to meet Argentina’s renewable energy targets. Macri’s improved economic policies

Brad Haynes & Hugh Bronstein, Argentina says #CiaoDefault, paying holdouts after 14 years, REUTERS
(Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-debt-idUSKCN0XJ1OO.
69

70

See St. James, supra note 35.

Carolina Millan, Argentina's Local Currency Notes Raised by S&P on Macri Policies, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
3, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-03/argentina-s-local-currency-notesraised-by-s-p-on-macri-policies.
71

See Taos Turner, Argentina’s Cut to Electricity Subsidies Will Raise Rates in Buenos Aires, The WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/argentinas-cut-to-electricitysubsidies-will-raise-rates-in-buenos-aires-1453939799.
72

See Millan, supra note 71. See also Peter de Jesus, S&P Raises Argentina Credit Ratings: Macri Policies
Working? LATIN POST (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.latinpost.com/articles/113314/20160204/s-praises-argentina-credit-ratings-macri-policies-working.htm.
73
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compliment Law 27,191, which replaces a heavily bureaucratic system with one embracing
corporate PPAs, private legal and financial intermediaries, and independent power
producers. 74 This section develops other complimentary policies that Macri should include
in his regulations enforcing Law 27,191.
(1) Promote credibility.75 Macri must embrace policies that promote credibility and
trust. This does not mean offering renewable developers far-above-market rates in 15-year
PPAs to offset risks—we saw this strategy fail in the Kirchner era, as financiers balked at the
state’s ability to amend or breach agreements, leaving developers without recourse. To build
trust, the Argentine government should issue a fresh statement of willingness to comply
with arbitration awards. And the state should comply with all existing and future awards
expediently. This increased transparency and reassurance should convince investors that the
endemic risk of the Kirchner era has passed.
(2) Ensure actual returns.76 Related to the promotion of credibility, in PPAs between
ENARSA, YPF, or CAMMESA 77 and providers of renewables, Argentina should show
more respect for renewable energy investors by omitting language that could be construed to
permit the state to unilaterally amend agreements. Leadership changes will occur in

74

See St. James, supra note 51.

75

See generally Lythgoe, supra note 1, at 340; St. James, supra note 51.

76

See generally Lythgoe, supra note 1, at 316, 337; St. James, supra note 51.

Since the renationalization of YPF in 2012, there has been overlap between YPF’s control over
Argentine energy development and that of the wholly state-run energy company, ENARSA.
Moreover, the wholesale market administrator, CAMMESA, will have a more direct role procuring
renewables under Law 27,191. Resolving the division of power between these entities and the
various federal agencies with enforcement authority over energy is another important task for
Macri’s administration.
77

15

democratic societies, but nothing will be built if investments are susceptible to being wiped
out on a political whim.
At a substantive level, state-issued PPAs should track successful European renewable
subsidy programs. Following Germany’s lead, Argentina should base purchase prices on
generation cost, rather than the spot market price. This tactic will lead to different prices for
wind power, solar power, biomass, and other projects of all different sizes; it will also likely
lead to the prioritization of wind energy development, which is a lower-cost renewable with
very high growth-potential in the Patagonian region. If possible, purchase guarantees should
extend for 20 years to assure the full amortization of new projects.
(3) Phase out subsidies and continue to raise electricity rates. 78 Over a decade of
below-cost electricity tariffs subsidized by the federal government have heavily impaired the
profitability of the electricity sector, resulting in frequent blackouts and eroding incentives to
invest in distribution and generation projects. The subsidies began in the early-2000s, when
oil prices were forecasted to quickly rise, and eventually became entrenched in Argentina’s
culture. Subsequently, Argentina has spent USD $51 billion on power subsidies since
2003—USD $10 billion (or roughly 2% of Argentina’s GDP) in 2015 alone. Macri should
continue to gradually phase in subsidy rationalization policies and seek to fully align electric
prices with generation and transmission costs by the end of his term in office. Before the
most recent rise in power tariffs in January, a 180 kilowatt per month household in Buenos

See generally Gabriel Di Bella et al., Energy Subsidies in Latin America and the Caribbean: Stocktaking
and Policy Challenges, International Monetary Fund Working Paper (Feb. 2015), at 25, 37, 43–44,
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1530.pdf; Argentina raises power tariffs in drive to
slash subsidies, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/argentina-electricityidUSL2N15D2J5; Carlos St. James, Dismantling Energy Subsidies in Latin America, LATIN AM.
ENERGY REV. (Jan. 26, 2016), http://carlosstjames.com/renewable-energy/dismantling-energysubsidies-in-latin-america/#_ftnref1.
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Aires would pay approximately USD $1.75; now, the same house pays approximately USD
$10.75. If the economy remains flat or worsens, Macri should consider modifying his
policies to mitigate harm from the subsidy rationalization to underprivileged communities.
But the broader national realignment of electricity prices and costs will be necessary to quell
artificially high demand—which has converted Argentina from a net energy exporter to a
net importer—and pass through some of the costs of new transmission and generation
infrastructure to consumers.
(4) Fix transmission infrastructure. 79 Although wind and solar energy developers
may dream of siting their projects in rural parts of Argentina with cheap land and abundant
renewable resources, an unsolved obstacle is the fact that “[t]here has been no real
investment in the transmission grid for years.” New transmission systems need to be built,
and while public infrastructure projects are a part of this, rules should also be put in place to
allow private renewable generators to include the cost of constructing transmission lines in
PPA prices.
D. CONCLUSION
Argentina’s renewable energy sector remains in an uncertain state, but for the first
time in years, there is reason to believe a renewable energy boom cycle is around the corner.
Argentina must exploit its vast renewable resources if it expects to meet its obligations under
the Paris Agreement and the growing demand that has overwhelmed the power grid in
recent years. Whereas the populist policies of the Kircher era were often used as a
justification for why the state could not afford to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Macri’s
economic policies are likely to spur investment in new wind and solar projects, at the very
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least. With a regulation and revised INDC on the table, it will be easier to tell if Law
27,191’s renewable generation targets are attainable. If they are, Argentina will move into
the clean development spotlight—a 20% renewable energy generation mix by 2025 would be
no small triumph.
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